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Abstract
The paradigm of American K-12 education is shifting as the institution of local educational
polities, each responsible for its own "common schools," faces competition from programs
of school choice. Although charter schools and related reforms are generally studied in
terms of quality and equity, the rise of consumer sovereignty as an alternative to political
sovereignty as an organizing principle for educational governance has much wider rami-
fications. Paradigms of choice have already begun dramatically to alter religious education
and its relationship to public schooling. Moreover, because these paradigms rely upon
consumer preferences and the aggregation of those preferences by markets, the shape of
religious activity in state-subsidized schools will be determined increasingly by consumers
and producers - parents and schools - rather than by political actors. Government is likely
to find its ability to limit and guide religion/school interactions substantially, and increas-
ingly, constrained. In making this argument, this paper draws primarily upon examples from
a small but instructive religious sector in American K-12 education, that ofJewish education.
It discusses the direct deployment of the charter-school form to provide Jewish education.
It then assesses ways in which shifts in the public framing of education from one of politics
to one of markets has transformed public school politics in school districts dominated by
Orthodox Jews.
Keywords
school choice; charter schools; First Amendment; religion; religious schools; Jewish educa-
tion; United States
I. Introduction
In the United States of America, two polities - states and school districts -
primarily determine the extent, nature, and distribution of K-12 educa-
tional services. They also provide those services in government-run schools
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2012 DOI 10.1163/22124810-00102001
AJ Saiger /journal of Law, Religion & State 1 (2012) 18o-214
and levy taxes in their support.' This institutional structure for educational
politics has enjoyed broad acceptance in both elite and popular American
thinking. Its longstanding dominance attests to the remarkable success of
Progressive educational reformers in establishing their particular vision of
schooling - the free, common, democratic public school - as American
education's "one best system."2
By subordinating schools to political authority, Progressive education
privileges voice. Options for exit are real but limited. Jurisdictional exit
involves concomitant entrance into some other jurisdiction, one which
also uses political structures to set its own school policies and to levy its
own school taxes. 3 Dissatisfied parents may also opt for private education.4
But opting out carries a hefty price tag: one loses one's entitlement to free
education but retains the duty of compulsory schooling. 5
Progressive institutional structures in today's United States, however,
face a competing paradigm that is gaining in influence, one that elevates
exit relative to voice. This paradigm assigns sovereignty not to the polity
but to the parent - the individual consumer. It rejects the necessity of bun-
dling government support of schooling with government provision of
educational services. And it understands every parent, whether his child
is educated in public school, private school, or at home, to be similarly
situated. The parent, not the community, bears a duty to provide for his
child's education and enjoys a corresponding entitlement to certain educa-
tional benefits from the state. Each parent determines, based on his own
preferences, how to discharge that duty and deploy those benefits.
E.g., Eugenia F. Toma, "Public Funding and Private Schooling Across Countries", 3 9JL.
& Econ. (1996), 121, 130. Over time, power has shifted from local school district to state.
See id; William G. Howell, Introduction to Besieged School Boards and the Future of
Educational Politics (2005), 1-5. Interventions by the federal government, by federal and
state courts, and by non-state actors are growing in importance but have not yet displaced
the basic local-state duopoly. See Howell, supra, at 6-9.
2 David B. Tyack, The One Best System:A History ofAmerican Urban Education (1974).
3 See Aaron J. Saiger, "The School District Boundary Problem", 42 Urb. Lawyer (2010),
495, 496.
4 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names ofJesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
5 See Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Spirit of the Law: Religious Voices and the Constitution
in Modem America (2010), 62 (in the 1930s, "Even opponents of aid for parochial schools
acknowledged that 'the Catholic[s] must pay an enormous bounty to protect [their] chil-
dren from the secular influence of the public school:"); Martha Minow, "Confronting the
Seduction of Choice: Law, Education, and American Pluralism", 120 Yale LU. (2011), 814,
819-820.
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Nowhere is this development better reflected than in the exploding
American charter school sector. The basic principle of chartering is the
empowerment of parents to choose to enroll a child in a charter school,
based upon the parent's individual determination that the particular char-
ter school is the best way to meet their specific child's needs. 6 Chartering
has proven itself an idea with legs. There were no charter schools in the
United States in 199o; today there are well over four thousand.7
This paper focuses upon one of several important areas that will change
significantly as the United States shifts from an educational politics
anchored exclusively in polity toward one also based upon the free choice
of subsidized consumers: the religious education of children. When states
and localities are responsible both for determining the content of curricula
and of school policy, and for providing those services directly, they are
bound by the First Amendment requirement that state actors not engage in
religious preference or practice. Families that desire religious education in
a Progressive world, therefore, are understood and understand themselves
to be ineligible for the public educational benefits provided by the com-
munity. Such families are sidelined from society's provision of education.
They sideline themselves. Under the model of consumer sovereignty, by
contrast, every family pursues its own preferences without mediation by
the polity. Under such a model parents whose preferences include religious
ones need not be regarded differently than anyone else. The Supreme Court
of the United States has blessed this perspective as a matter of First
Amendment law, holding that, should the state subsidize education on a
religiously neutral basis, such subsidies can be directed by parents (although
not by the state) to religious schools.8
This short paper argues that, as the American legal and general cultures
increasingly understand education properly to be subject to consumer as
well as political sovereignty, the status, reach, and nature of religious
education will shift dramatically. No longer will religious schooling be a
sideline to the public system, relegated to those who opt out. Those with
religious preferences will increasingly expect that their preferences be
treated on a par with private preferences of other kinds. Their insistence is
likely to meet with at least partial success. Moreover, because alternatives
to Progressive education emphasize consumer preferences and the aggre-
gation of those preferences by markets, the shape of religious activity in
6 Seeinfra Part If.
7 See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
8 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills
School Dist. 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
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state-subsidized schools will be determined increasingly by consumers and
producers - parents and schools - rather than by political actors. State
agents are likely to find their ability to limit and guide the religion-school
interaction noticeably and increasingly constrained.
In making this argument, this paper draws primarily upon examples
from a small but instructive religious sector in American K-12 education,
that of Jewish education. After a brief account of the Progressive status quo
in education in Part II, the paper considers two types of challenges to its
assumptions that have arisen in the American Jewish community. Part III
analyzes efforts to use the charter school form to advance Jewish educa-
tion. Part V discusses religious Jewish sectarians in several school districts
who captured political control of their districts while continuing to edu-
cate their own children privately. These efforts, although they involve polit-
ical rather than market institutions, share with charters a reliance upon
parents' primary self-understanding as sovereign consumers of educational
goods rather than as citizens. Both developments gain their energy and
legitimacy from the waning of Progressivism.
II. Progressive Schooling and Religious Education
Beginning in the 19th century and extending into the first decades of
the 2oth, American education underwent a spectacular "organizational
revolution."9 Progressive reformers, with extraordinary energy and success,
displaced the "voluntary and incidental" community-based schools that
had existed across the country in favor of consolidated, government-run,
professionalized, and bureaucratized school systems.'0 The Progressive
revolution was wide, deep, and long-lasting. Although the Progressive
institutional model has changed over time in important ways - particularly
by means of interventions by the federal government and by federal and
state courts - basic tenets of Progressivism today remain standard features
of the American public school.
9 Tyack, supra note 2, at 6-7, 16. In some states, Progressive dominance was achieved
substantially earlier. See, e.g., Ohio ex rel Ohio Cong. of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd of
Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148, 1157 28 (Ohio 2006).
10 Tyack, supra note 2, at 6-7,16.
11 See George M. Thomas, Lisa R. Peck, and Channin G. De Haan, "Reforming Education,
Transforming Religion, 1876-1931', in C. Smith (ed.), The Secular Revolution: Power, Interests,
and Conflict in the Secularization of American Life (2003), 355.
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Among those features are:
Public schools are government agencies. The agency is the local school
district, and it is managed by an elected board. 2 The school district is
also a taxing authority, and local taxes combined with state subven-
tions together constitute the vast majority of the school budget.'3
Federal expenditure on K-12 education was long minimal and has
never exceeded ten percent of all educational expenditures. 14
Political control over education is mitigated by a policy of deference to
professional judgment. It is proper for elected school boards to dele-
gate much of their authority, particularly with respect to curriculum
and other pedagogical matters, to a professionalized school superin-
tendent, usually trained by a Progressive school of education.1 5
Formally, however, the superintendent remains an agent of the board.
Public schools charge no tuition and are open to all children resident
in the locality. Many states understand these policies to be mandated
by constitutional provisions drafted in the heyday of Progressive edu-
cation that require public schools to be "free" and "common."'6 A "com-
mon" school must serve all children, regardless of religion and
economic class, and educate them in a common civic and political
culture.
The public school has an explicit political agenda: educate children for
citizenship. Therefore it is to create a community in school that is not
only governed by the polity of its district but that models democratic
polity for its students. 17
By the time the Supreme Court began to use a modern framework to ana-
lyze cases involving religion and schooling,'8 the wider American culture,
12 See Michael B. Berkman and Eric Plutzer, Ten Thousand Democracies: Politics and
Public Opinion in America's School Districts (2005), 18.
13 Id at 25-26.
14 Id at 17.
" This aspect of Progressive thinking is associated particularly with Ellwood Patterson
Cubberley. See Kathryn A. McDermott, Controlling Public Education: Localism Versus Equity
(1999), 15.
16 See Aaron J. Saiger, "School Choice and States' Duty to Support 'Public' Schools", 48
Boston College L Rev. (2007), 909, 930-931 & n.13o (providing a taxonomy of state constitu-
tional provisions).
17 See Henry M. Levin and Clive R. Belfield, "The Marketplace in Education", 27 Review of
Research in Education (2004), 183; Don Dippo, "From Refuge to Polis: Shifting the Rationale
for Religiosity in Schools", 24 Educ. PolJ (2010), 205,2o8-209.
18 See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Everson v. Board ofEducation, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
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including its schools and courts, had come to understand public schools as
defined by these Progressive principles. There was no other model.
Progressive education had won its battle to be considered, in Tyack's famous
phrase, the "one best system."9
It was the intersection of the "one best system" and the Court's interpre-
tation of the First Amendment that yielded the now-familiar principles
that public schooling in the United States must be nearly entirely secular,
free of religious teaching and practice. Many Progressives themselves had
advocated what they thought of as secularism in their common schools,
rejecting earlier American understandings of education as an inherently
religious enterprise. 20 At the same time, few Progressives understood secu-
larism to require a rigorous irreligiosity, as we mostly do today. Progressivism
strenuously opposed schools taking a position in the "sectarian," interne-
cine doctrinal and political debates of Protestantism. 21 But anti-sectarian-
ism did not imply a rejection of the nondenominational Protestantism
typical of American schools into the second half of the 20th century, which
some Progressives even supported. 22
The Court's insistence upon a more thorough secularism, however, was
based directly upon other tenets of the Progressive revolution: that schools
were to be publicly governed, funded, and staffed. For example, Engel
v. Vitale, the landmark case holding school prayer unconstitutional, turns in
its entirety upon public schools being government agencies whose pro-
gram is established and implemented by government employees. Religious
exercises, the Court argues in Engel, cannot be conducted by a "civil magis-
trate"23 acting in an "official capacity."24 It is the government, not the school
per se, that "is without power to prescribe by law any particular form of
prayer."25 Similarly, the Court's decision extending Engel to bar public
recitation of Bible verses in school, Abington Township v. Schempp, empha-
sized that such readings were "held in the school buildings under the
supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those
19 See Tyack, supra note 2.
20 See Kent Greenawalt, Does God Belong in Public Schools? (2005), 16; Hugh Heclo,
Christianity and American Democracy (2007), 86-89.
21 See Lloyd P. Joregenson, The State and the Non-Public School 1825-1925 (1987), 20-23;
Thomas, Peck, and De Haan, supra note n, at 359-360, 378-379.
22 See Greenawalt, supra note 2o, at 16; James C. Carper and Thomas C. Hunt, The
Dissenting Tradition in American Education (2007), 122; Thomas, Peck, and De Haan, supra
note 11, at 381-382.
23 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 432 (1962).
24 Id. at 422.
25 Id at 430.
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schools."26 The Court reiterated that "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights
was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political contro-
versy [and] to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials...
One's right to... freedom of worship... and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 27
When cases like Engel and Schempp were decided, it was obvious to
everyone that the Court's reference to a "teache[r] employed in th[e]
schools" 28 signified a public employee. The cases were not intended to
apply, and nobody understood them to apply, to private schools. Today,
however, "public" schools are established under neoliberal quasi-markets
as well as by centralized bureaucratic control. Religious practices in such
schools are not "submitted to a vote;"29 instead they emerge from the equi-
librium of a market. The categories of "public" and "private" schooling, too
self-evident to the 1960s Court even to need defining,30 are not straightfor-
ward to apply to the schools being created amidst the educational revolu-
tion of today.3'
III. Charter Schools and Religious Education
A. Sources and characteristics of the charter schoolform
Today, the most prominent challenge to the Progressive "one best system" is
the argument that schooling should be provided through market rather
than political institutions. Market-oriented advocacy has not replaced
the Progressive common school with schools of choice to the extent that
26 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).
27 Id at 226 (citing West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 638 (1943)).
28 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223.
29 Id at 226.
30 See William J. Reese, History, Education, and the Schools (2007), 102 ("By the late nine-
teenth century, competing systems of schools had thus emerged - one labeled public, all
others private - and these distinctions long endured."). The Progressive revolution itself
upended understandings of "public" and "private" that had been dominant in earlier peri-
ods. See Carl Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools andAmerican Society, 178o-186o
(1983), 13 (until the Progressive revolution "the terms 'public' and 'private' did not have their
present connotations, and most schools did not fit neatly into either of our modem
categories").
31 See State ex reL Ohio Congress of Parents & Teachers v. State Bd. of Educ., 857 N.E.2d 1148
27 (2006). ("Throughout time, new educational movements have faced opponents and
detractors. But just as the common-school movement of the i8oos increasingly gained
supporters throughout the United States, so too has the charter-school movement.").
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neoliberalism itself has become a new "one best system," nor is it likely to
do so. But neither are market institutions a flash in the pan. Schools of
choice, "one of the most highly visible tools aimed at changing the very
governance of education,"32 have grown explosively over the past decade,
and continue to grow robustly. If their impact can be sustained, they will
represent no less an educational revolution than the reforms instituted by
the Progressives a century ago.33 Already, they have shattered the organiza-
tional, ideological, and cultural monopoly that Progressive education once
held in American educational culture.3
As noted above, the organizing principle of the Progressive approach is
citizenship: schools are part of the government, their authority rests upon
local sovereignty, and they prepare students to become citizens themselves.
The organizing institution of neoliberalism is the market - a peculiar,
subsidized sort of market, but a market nonetheless. 35 Its actors exercise
consumer, not political, sovereignty.36 Instead of the community making
collective choices about the kind of education it offers its children, each
family chooses schools for their children based upon its individual prefer-
ences in a marketplace of schools that compete with one another for
students. As in any other competitive market, schools that meet consumer
demands are intended to flourish; those that fail are meant to wither away.37
The recent history of school choice in America has been described else-
where, and I give only the nutshell here. Growing disenchantment with
educational outcomes in Progressive schools catalyzed arguments that
market-based schooling enjoys structural comparative advantages over
state-provided schooling. Schools forced to be responsive to a marketplace
would have no choice but to generate academic achievement. The bureau-
cratic, state-run school, by contrast, faces no consequences for failure and
therefore lacks incentives to succeed.38
32 Mark Schneider and Jack Buckley, "Charter Schools as a Tool to Reform Local Schools
by Transforming Governance", in R.C. Feiock (ed.), Metropolitan Governance: Conflict,
Competition, and Cooperation (2004), 183,184.
33 Cf Ohio Congress, 857 N.E.2d at 1157 27 (drawing an analogy between Progressive
educational reform and the charter school movement).
3 See Minow, supra note 5, at 843.
35 See Saiger, supra note 16, at 952-953.
36 See Schneider and Buckley, supra note 32, at 187-189 (describing charters as a form of
polycentric rather than monocentric governance).
37 SeeJack Buckley and Mark Schneider, Charter Schools: Hope or Hype? (2007), 7.
38 See Jeffrey R. Henig, Spin Cycle: How Research is Used in Policy Debates: The Case of
Charter Schools (2008), 38, 40-42, 46 (describing these arguments and noting that charter
schools, unlike vouchers, were also initially motivated by a desire to "give teachers the space
and resources to use their full range of skills and imagination to educate").
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These arguments first gave rise to a movement for school vouchers,
Le., government subsidies issued to parents that could be directed either
to private or public schools, at the parents' discretion. Because voucher
programs were potentially very expensive, early voucher experiments were
restricted to poor children, and individual voucher amounts were low.3 9
Concomitantly, because the existing pool of private schools prepared to
accept relatively small subsidies to educate poor children was largely reli-
gious, voucher experiments perforce involved a lot of religious, especially
Catholic, schools. 40 These schools therefore proceeded under a cloud of
possible unconstitutionality.4 1 In 2002, however, in the pathmarking case of
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional
a voucher program in the city of Cleveland, Ohio. The Court based its
conclusion upon the observation that any government money arriving via
vouchers in the hands of a parochial school does so only because of the
"genuine and independent choice" of parents among schools rather than
because of state decisions. 4 2
Voucher programs continue to be of legal and political interest.43 In the
aftermath of Zelman, conventional wisdom was that the reform had flamed
out: vouchers were enacted in only a handful of jurisdictions, and even
repealed in some of those.44 More recently, vouchers have found some new
life in several statehouses and in the United States Congress. 45 Political
popularity aside, vouchers remain important not only because they enjoy
the specific sanction of the Supreme Court, but because they are a fairly
pure market-based reform. Although government subsidy makes vouchers
less than purely libertarian,4 6 they are close enough to be attractive to
39 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002).
40 Id. at 647.
41 See id at 656 n.4 ("a principal barrier to entry of new private schools is the uncertainty
caused by protracted litigation which has plagued the program since its inception").
42 Id. at 652.
43 See, e.g., Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. 1436 (2011).
44 See Henig, supra note 38, at 42-44.
45 See Mary Ann Zehr, "Capacity Issue Looms for Vouchers", Educ. Wk. (June 15, 2011), at 1
(reporting new, expanded, or potential voucher programs in the District of Columbia,
Indiana, Wisconsin, Florida, and Pennsylvania); Sean Cavanagh, "GOP Lawmakers Press
Voucher Expansion in States", Educ. Wk. (Apr. 27,2011), at 22; Michelle D. Anderson, "Budget
Compromise Puts Vouchers Back on Track for Students in DC", Educ. Wk. (Apr. 27, 2011),
at 25.
46 See, e.g, Donald E. Erickson, "A Libertarian Perspective on Schooling", in WL. Boyd and
J.G. Cibulka (eds.), Private Schools and Public Policy: International Perspectives (1989), 21,
21-22.
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a Milton Friedman.47 Advocacy for vouchers helped to normalize the
market-oriented partial privatization of schooling and make it seem less
alarming, in both the legal and general cultures. This intellectual and ideo-
logical groundwork paved the way for the rise of the charter school, the
most ubiquitous and important educational reform of the contemporary
American scene.
Charters, like vouchers, offer potential to realize the neoliberal expecta-
tion that competition and entrepreneurialism can produce better educa-
tional results than hierarchy, monopoly, and decision making through
politics.48 In charters' ideal form (state regulations vary), any group may
organize a charter school and solicit students. 49 Charters are therefore fre-
quently described as "publicly funded but privately run" or "public but
largely independent."50 Families may then choose among traditional public
school(s) for which they are eligible and available charter schools. By enroll-
ing in a charter, a student redirects from her local public school to the char-
ter some substantial portion of the government subsidy that the former
school would otherwise have received.
Many states require charters to demonstrate adequate academic achieve-
ment by their students. In return, charters are exempt from much but not
all the regulatory apparatus that constrains traditional public schools.5'
They are regulated much less invasively than traditional public schools
with respect to such matters as curriculum, organization, and discipline.52
They are often exempted from the collective bargaining agreements
reached by their local school districts with teachers and other staff.53 Chart-
ers are also generally prohibited from discriminating among students in
admission or charging tuition; oversubscribed charters are supposed to
admit students by lottery. Within these strictures, charters compete for
47 Milton Friedman, "The Role of Government in Education", in R.A. Solo (ed.),Economics
and the Public Interest (1955), 123.
48 There is a substantial literature regarding whether this expectation has been borne
out. For overviews, see generally Henig, supra note 38; J.R. Betts and P.T. Hill (eds.), Taking
Measure of Charter Schools (2010).
49 See Chester E. Finn, Bruno V. Manno and Gregg Vanourek, Charter Schools in Action
(2001), 15.
50 Associated Press, "Foundations Help Charter Network Secure Bonds", Educ. Wk.
(May 12,2oo), at 4.
51 See Mark Schneider, Paul Teske, and Melissa Marschall, Choosing Schools: Consumer
Choice and the Quality of American Schools (2002), 26.
52 See R. Kenneth Godwin and Frank R. Kemerer, School Choice Tradeoffs: Liberty, Equity,
and Diversity (201o), 6.
53 See id
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students with other charters and with other types of schools. If students
enroll, a charter thrives. Otherwise it dies.5 4
The charter sector has exploded. In 2oo8-o9, 1.4 million children were
enrolled in 4,700 charter schools, making charters five percent of all public
schools. 55 By comparison, 500,000 children were enrolled in 2,000 charters
in 2000, and there were no charter schools in 1990.56 In New Orleans, almost
all government-funded schools are now charter schools. 57 The Obama
Administration has repeatedly expressed strong support for further expan-
sion of charters. 58 The possibility that chartering is a reform that will "fizzle
out" seems to be receding,5 9 although its rate of growth is slowing.60
Charters and other market reforms are touted by some as the salvation of
an American educational system in crisis. Others decry them as folly, as
acquiescing in an impoverished or incoherent educational teleology, and as
exacerbating inequity. The debates over these claims are extremely impor-
tant, but this research does not join them. Instead, the present paper takes
the position that charters and other neoliberal reforms are substantially
entrenched. They may not displace Progressivism, but they have already
displaced the Progressive ideological monopoly in law, on the ground, and
in the culture. Given that a neoliberal alternative to Progressive education
has emerged, this paper and the larger project of which it is a part ask how
this will affect various aspects of American governance in education. In
particular, how will it affect our understanding of the role of religion in
state-funded schools?
B. The religious-culture charter school
Chartering allows groups with particularistic and idiosyncratic agendas to
aggregate themselves into schools and apply for state funds. It invites niche
54 See Schneider, Teske, and Marschall, supra note 51, at 26; Finn, Manno, and Vanourek,
supra note 49, at 15-16.
55 Susan Aud et al., The Condition of Education 2011 at 24, 84 (Nat'l Center for Educ. Stats.
2011-033).
56 Joseph Murphy and Catherine Dunn Shiffman, Understanding and Assessing the
Charter School Movement (2002), 28-29.
57 See Robert A. GardaJr., "The Politics of Education Reform: Lessons from New Orleans",
40J L & Educ. (2011), 57.
58 See Erik K. Robelen, "State Picture on Charter Caps Still Mixed", Educ. Wk. (12 Aug.
2009), at 19.
59 Stephen D. Sugarman and Emlei M. Kuboyama, "Approving Charter Schools: The Gate-
Keeper Function", 53 Admin. L Re. (2ool), 869, 871 (noting, but not predicting or endorsing,
this possibility).
60 See Buckley and Schneider, supra note 37, at 3.
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marketing: charter schools, like magnet schools before them, 61 often have
themes. 62 Some target specific areas of inquiry, from civics to engineering
to marine biology. Some focus on particular foreign languages. Others tar-
get groups defined by criteria other than language.63 It is not surprising,
therefore, that consumers and providers of religious education imagine
charter schools organized around religious themes. For those who take
the position that religion is but one more kind of interest, just another way
of affiliating among the plethora of affiliations that compete in the conso-
ciational marketplace, the religious charter is not a big leap.64
Legally, the legitimacy of such an approach is heightened by the
unquestioned neutrality of the charter concept toward religion. Neutrality
characterizes both the etiology and the administration of charters. Unlike
many other programs that direct public resources toward religious
education, such as tuition tax credits or private-school vouchers, there is no
plausible suggestion that charter laws were motivated by any impulse to
promote religion or religious education. Chartering has been conceived,
justified, debated, and adopted as a secular reform with secular goals.
Moreover, the consociational characteristics of a charter system emerge
from the bottom up, not from the top down. Were a charter to be granted to
a religious charter school, it would be because one applied, not because it
was a state actor. To be sure, there is state action involved in granting such
a charter; but that action is accomplished pursuant to existing statutes and
regimes of bureaucratic discretion that are religiously neutral.
The states have chosen, however, not to treat religion as they do
other categories of interests or associations. Instead, state charter laws
ubiquitously require charters to be secular, either through explicit require-
ments that they be "nonsectarian" or "nonreligious,"65 and/or implicitly by
61 See Henig, supra note 38, at 35-36.
62 See Bruce Fuller, "Growing Charter Schools, Decentering the State", in B. Fuller (ed.),
Inside Charter Schools: The Paradox of Radical Decentralization (2000), 1, 7.
63 A close parallel to religiously oriented charters is offered by charters with ethnic
themes. Although open to all, these schools typically attract disproportionately members of
the groups whose culture is emphasized. For example, there are Afrocentric charters and
Native-American-centric charters. Martha Minow, In Brown's Wake: Legacies of America's
Educational Landmark (2010), 103, 128; Linda Jacobson, "Charters with Native Hawaiian
Focus Get Aid Infusion", Educ. Wk. (Oct. 26, 2005), at 26.
6 Cf Minow, supra note 63, at 86 (decisions by Supreme Court on the border of free
speech and free exercise also promote this idea).
65 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-183(E)(2); Calif. Educ. Code § 476o5[d]; l0 Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 66aa(l); 14 Del. Code § 5o6(a)(2); Indiana Code § 20-24-1-4; Iowa Code § 25 6F.4 (2)(b);
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designating charters as "public schools."66 Federal law encourages this
stance by barring federal funding for sectarian charters. 67 It is far from obvi-
ous that states must make this choice as a matter of federal constitutional
law, given Zelman's approval of public subsidies to parents whose school
choices may include overtly religious private schools. Nevertheless, there
is a strong argument that states may elect to exclude religious charters.
In 2004, the Supreme Court upheld a program of graduate scholarships,
run by the State of Washington, that provided state monies to graduate
students in their chosen fields, but that excluded students choosing to
pursue degrees in theology or other devotional topics. 68 The Court held
that the "play" between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 69 per-
mitted, though it did not require, states so to exclude religious education
from otherwise neutral programs of subsidy. State requirements that char-
ters be secular are, at least on their face, similar. They subsidize individual
choices but restrict those choices to the secular realm.
There are several potential motives for states to exclude religious char-
ters. They may think (potentially erroneously) that the First Amendment
requires them to do so, or they may want to forestall litigation on the ques-
tion. States whose constitutions include Blaine Amendments or similar
provisions, 70 which forbid the allocation of state monies to religious
actors, may have determined that the exclusion was required by their own
constitutions.
There are also fiscal arguments for insisting that charter schools be
secular. Eighty percent of children enrolled in private schools in the United
States study in religious schools. 7' Currently, these students' parents pay
taxes but forgo the expensive services that the state offers to its children.
If religious schools could easily recast themselves as charters and thereby
gain access to public support, the drain on education budgets would be
both substantial and sudden.
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 124D.lo Subd. 8(d); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-la-507(1); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 59-40-40(1); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 118.40 (4)(a)(2).
66 See infra notes 72-73.
67 See Benjamin Siracusa Hillman "Is There a Place for Religious Charter Schools?", 118
Yale L.J. (2008), 554, 561 & n.27.
68 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
69 Id at 718.
70 See Mark Edward DeForrest,"An Overview and Evaluation ofState Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns", 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y (2oo3), 551,
556-557.
7' See http://www.capenet.org/facts.html (website of the Council for American Private
Education, citing reports from National Center for Education Statistics).
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States also have ideological and political reasons to exclude religious
education from public support. Some may support separationism in gen-
eral; others may wish not to fund the educational practices of particular
minority sects. More subtle political factors also promote religious exclu-
sion. Although charter schools are undeniably public/private hybrids -
privately run, but publicly funded - advocates of charters often insist that
charter schools are by definition public schools. 72 This claim, pressed by
charter advocates, has been incorporated into the chartering statutes of
many states, 73 largely to generate political support for chartering. The
centrality of "public education" remains a potent value in American
politics, and charters defined as "public" are consistent with that value. The
arguments that charters divert funds from public education - which they
self-evidently do if by "public education" one means only the traditional,
72 A pro-charter interest group, for example, has named itself the "National Alliance for
Public Charter Schools." See http://www.publiccharters.org. See also Martha Minow, "We're
All for Equality in U.S. School Reforms: But What Does it Mean?", in M. Minow, R.A. Shweder,
and H. Markus (eds.),Just Schools: Pursuing Equality in Societies of Difference (2oo8), 21, 40
(recites state rules that charters be nonsectarian, "open and free for all students"; then says
"Although often exempt from systemwide rules governing textbook adoptions and even
unionization, charter schools operate as public schools. They must also be academically and
fiscally accountable to the public school system as well as to the parents who choose to send
their children there."); Vicki L. Phillips, "It's Time for Public Schools and Public Charters to
Work Together", Educ. Wk. (Jan. 12, 2011), at 29 (Gates Foundation official arguing that we
should attack "one of the most persistent divides in public education and accelerate pro-
gress for all our students: public charter schools v. traditional public schools.").
73 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-181(A) ("Charter schools are public schools that serve as
alternatives to traditional public schools"); Official Code Ga. Ann. § 20-2-2082 ("A commis-
sion charter school shall exist as a public school within the state as a component of the
delivery of public education"); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-30.5-102(3) ("In authorizing charter
schools, it is the intent of the general assembly.. to advance a renewed commitment by the
state of Colorado to the mission, goals, and diversity of public education"); lo Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 66aa(s) ("'Charter school' means a public, nonsectarian school"); 14 Del. Code § 501
(charters are "independent public schools"); Fla. Stats. § 1002.33(1) ("Charter schools shall be
part of the state's program of public education"); 52 Idaho Code § 33-5202 ("public charter
schools... [o]perate independently from the existing traditional school district but within
the existing public school system"); Indiana Code § 20-24-1-4 (("'Charter school' means a
public elementary school or secondary school"); Iowa Code § 256F.1(1) ("Charter schools...
shall be part of the state's program of public education"); 1O5 Ill. Comp. Stats. § 5/27A-2
(charters are a species of "flexible and innovative techniques and programs... within the
public school system"); Kan. Stats. § 72-1903(a) (charters "an alternative means within the
public school system"); Md. Code Educ. § 9-101(b) (charters "an alternative means within
the public school system"); New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 § 2853(1)(b-1)(c)
("A charter school shall be deemed an independent and autonomous public school"). But see
New York State Charter Schools Act of 1998 § 2853(4) (enumerating contexts in which char-
ter schools are deemed to be nonpublic schools).
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district-run schools - therefore loses political, if not analytic, force when
charters are branded as "public." Insisting that charters are public schools
helps distinguish them from politically unpopular voucher programs.
Similarly, it is hard to imagine the Obama Administration endorsing the
charter movement so enthusiastically without being able to claim that
charter schools are public schools. But one consequence of charters being
"public" schools is that they must be secular, because part of the pervasive
understanding of public schools, born under the "one best system," is that
they are necessarily secular.
Therefore, although change in the medium term is possible, for the near
term it appears that the ban on religious charter schools is well entrenched.
This does not end the matter, however. The bottom-up nature of charter-
ing still leaves a great deal of room for religiously-inflected entrepreneurs to
deploy the form to their advantage. Moreover, the extent to which appli-
cant schools tread near the limits of the rule that charters must be secular
depends not on bureaucratic decisions but on decisions by private market
actors.
One straightforward and important tactic available to such actors is to
organize a school around the "secular" or "cultural" aspects of a religious
community, while eschewing explicitly religious study and the overt perfor-
mance of religious rites.74 This tactic has been especially attractive, in the
United States, to Jews and to Muslims, who are small religious and cultural
minorities and for whom the transmission of distinctive cultures, in both
their secular and religious dimensions, is part of the mission of religious
education. Already there are several such charter schools operating in more
than half a dozen states. 75
Jewish charter schools, generally characterized as "Hebrew-language"
charter schools, take a range of approaches to the requirement that they be
secular. Unlike classic Jewish day schools and yeshivot (the Orthodox
version of such schools), all eschew religious instruction and sponsor no
74 See Lawrence D. Weinberg, Religious Charter Schools: Legalities and Practicalities
(2007), xx-xxi.
75 See Preston Green III, "Charter Schools and Religious Institutions: A Match Made in
Heaven?", 158 West's Ed Law. Rep. (2001), 1; Note, "Church, Choice, and Charters: A New
Wrinkle for Public Education?",122 Harv. L Rev. (2009), 175o; Hillman, supra note 67. There
are also "Christian" charters, in the sense that their origin and program reflect continuing
roots in Christian religious education. See, e.g., Christopher O'Donnell, "Palmetto Christian
to Become Public School", Herald-Tribune (Sarasota, Fla.) (Nov. 2, 2009); Jennifer Smith
Richards, "Charter's Ties to Christian School Draw State Scrutiny", Columbus Dispatch
(Nov. 8, 2010); J.C. Reindl,"Knight Academy Charter School Schedule to Open in West
Toledo", Toledo Blade (July 11, 2oo8).
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prayers. But they do many other things that religiousJewish private schools
routinely do. Most notably, they teach the Hebrew language.76 The schools
also teach, to a greater or lesser degree, "about" Judaism and its "religious
culture." They may display Jewish symbols that straddle the boundary
between culture and religion. They may mark and/or close on Jewish
holidays. They may observe Jewish dietary laws in their cafeterias. They
may accommodate, without sponsoring, student prayer and religious study
groups. And, by creating an academic program of particular interest to
Jews, some create, to a greater or lesser extent, a social and cultural setting
in the school that is visibly Jewish, though not monolithically so.77
In this description, the phrases "they may" and "some" are ubiquitous.
Schools' efforts to approach but not cross the line between secular and
religious education are marked by a series of somewhat arbitrary, and not
invariably necessary, compromises. Each decision is driven by a panoply of
factors, including the religious commitments of the schools and parents,
educational preferences, understanding of market conditions, and expec-
tations regarding the "considerable criticism and extensive monitoring"
that have accompanied their founding.7 8 A law student who interviewed
the founders of the Ben Gamla network of Hebrew charter schools in
Florida, for example, reports that their flagship school purposely remains
open on Jewish holidays, even as it maintains a kosher cafeteria; it "teaches
aboutJewish culture and history, but... has scrubbed the curriculum of spe-
cifically religious content."79 Other Hebrew charters have made these com-
promises differently. Some do not require the study of Hebrew, offering it
only as an elective.8 0 Others place a relatively greater emphasis upon
instruction in Jewish culture and tradition.
There is no doubt that these Hebrew charter schools are, in the economic
sense, substitutes for private religious schools. They offer consumers a dif-
ferent set of trade-offs across educational goods than other arrangements
for religious education do. The two basic differences are that they eschew
religious instruction and do not charge tuition. There are other tradeoffs as
well. The charters do not require a commitment from children beyond
the ordinary public school day, for example. They are more integrated
socially and religiously than private Jewish schools. They offer a different
76 See Julie Wiener, 2011. "L.A. Charter Tests Genre", (N.Y)Jewish Wk. (May1 3 , 2011), ati.
77 See Minow, supra note 63, at 46; Hillman, supra note 67, at 569.
78 Hillman, supra note 67, at 569.
79 Id
80 See Wiener, supra note 76.
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menu of secular curricular and co-curricular programs from their private
counterparts.
Whether this makes Hebrew charter schools desirable or inadequate
substitutes for privately provided Jewish education depends upon where
you sit. There can be no doubt that "to the extent that faith-based charter
schools seek to teach about religion in a manner similar to what transpires
in religiously affiliated non-public schools... they will be prohibited from
doing so."81 Hebrew charters are but partial substitutes for traditional day
schools. But the choice among partial substitutes rests with each consumer.
The fractured ideologies, theologies, and sociologies of contemporary
American Judaism ensure that those choices will vary widely.
Absent formal sociological studies of school choice in the Jewish
community, as an informal matter it nevertheless seems possible to identify
two primary categories of consumers.8 2 One consists of highly affiliated
families, primarily Orthodox, for whom rigorous Jewish education is a
strong desideratum. In this group, private education in yeshiva day schools
is the strong norm,83 and group members typically undertake considerable
sacrifice and expense to procure it. For religious families considering
Hebrew charters as a potential substitute foryeshiva education, the absence
of religion in the charters is a strong negative. But it is offset by relief from
what can be a crushing tuition burden.84 In the Orthodox world, with its
fairly large families, the need to pay five-figureyeshiva tuitions for multiple
children has become an overwhelming problem, a source of great concern
among community leaders and deep angst amongst its laity.85 In the
wake of recent stresses in the U.S. economy, these concerns are
81 CharlesJ. Russo and Gerald M. Cattaro, "Faith-Based Charter Schools: An Idea Whose
Time is Unlikely to Come", 36 Religion & Educ. (2009), 72,86.
82 A similarly ad hoc characterization appears in Carmel U. Chiswick, Economics of
American Judaism (2008), 11o.
83 See Julie Wiener, "Teaneck Parents Eyeing Public (School) Option", (NY)Jewish Wk.
(March 22, 2011) (Orthodox parents sending children to public school "unthinkable, almost
taboo"; parents considering such a choice "agreed to speak to the Jewish Week only if their
real names were not printed").
' See Chiswick, supra note 82, at 114.
85 The Internet is a favorite venue for complaints. A blogger made his name by describing
a "$200K chump," unable to afford a $6o,ooo yeshiva bill for four children in Bergen County
notwithstanding his six-figure salary, See 'The Finances of a Hypothetical $2ooK Chump",
Bergen County Yeshiva Tuition Blog, June 10, 201o, available at http://2ookchump.blogspot
.com/2010/06/finances-of-hypothetical-200k-chump.html, (visited July 27, 2011). The quan-
tity and emotionalism of comments on this topic in this and similar cybervenues is
remarkable.
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rising.86 A recent headline in a local Jewish paper - "Tuition or Mortgage:
Choosing Public School over Homelessness" - simultaneously captures the
extent of the tuition burden and the strength of theyeshiva norm.87 At this
writing, the pressing and growing need for tuition relief among the tradi-
tionally observant continues for most but not all to be outweighed by the
fact that, for that community, the religious dimension of Jewish education
is its raison d'&re. 88
A second market sector consists of families for whom Hebrew language
charters present primarily an alternative to secular schools. For some, but
by no means all, such families, were it not for the Hebrew charter, they
would privately procure supplemental, after-school religious education.
For this group, relative costs loom less large and choices are shaped primar-
ily by non-economic preferences. It is almost certain that for some the
choice is driven entirely by factors having to do with the non-religious
dimensions of the programs - the quality of the education in traditional
secular subjects, time in the classroom, the feel of the school - without
regard to its Judaism or Hebraicism. Such parents are similar to those unin-
terested in Catholicism who nevertheless choose Catholic schools,8 9 or to
parents who report to researchers that proximity to their house is the most
important factor in making a school choice.90
Armchair sociologists familiar with the American Jewish community
will, I expect, acknowledge the existence of these two different and identifi-
able groups, but resist the dichotomy presented as a fairly crude generaliza-
tion. They will be right to do so. For every tradeoff that Hebrew charters
present, and within every stratum of religious observance and cultural
affiliation, there will be Jewish families with exactly opposite views of what
constitutes a cost and a benefit. Many Jewish parents, some of them
Orthodox, ascribe positive political valence to multiculturalism, to secular
public schooling, and to the classic institutional forms of public education.
86 See Jack Wertheimer, "The High Cost of Jewish Living", Commentary (March 2010), 17,
17-18.
87 Mayer Fertig, "Tuition or Mortgage: Choosing Public School over Homelessness",
Jewish Star (Aug. 21, 2009), available at http://thejewishstar.wordpress.com/2oo9/o8/i8/
tuition-or-mortgage-choosing-public-school-over-homelessness.
88 See Wertheimer, supra note 86, at 19.
89 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 704 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The fami-
lies made it clear that they had not chosen the schools because they wished their children to
be proselytized in a religion not their own, or in any religion, but because of educational
opportunity.").
90 See id at 704 & n.12 (Souter, J., dissenting); Saiger, supra note 16, at 955 & nn.281-282
(reviewing literature).
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These parents, even as they may desire Hebrew education for their
children, will experience some aspects of the synthesis of Hebrew charter-
ing and public education as a benefit, and the simultaneous challenges that
Hebrew chartering poses to classic public-school values as a cost. Similarly,
many parents would prefer to get Hebrew education for free from the state,
rather than pay for it; but some, even as they avail themselves of expensive
private schooling, might avoid Hebrew charters because they believe that
publicly funded schools should be secular and/or because they identify
charters in general or Hebrew charters in particular as "public schools."
Consider also the fact that the student populations of Hebrew charters
are likely to be more heavily Jewish than ordinary secular schools. Again,
there will be parents choosing between those two types of schools who
view social stratification as a cost, and others who view it as a benefit.
Similarly, weight will be assigned to heterogeneity by those choosing
between a Hebrew charter and a yeshiva. So too will Jews disagree in
their normative assessments of the extent to which charters emphasize
"religious culture." A paradigmatic example is a population of secular
expatriate Israelis in America that has enrolled its children in Jewish day
schools and grudgingly tolerated their rabbinic leadership, religious cast,
and high tuitions in order to train their children in Jewish culture, Israeli
culture, and Hebrew language. For these parents, who would have tended
toward secular schools (the "mamlachti" system) had they remained in
Israel, the religious aspects of American day school education are costs,
and the willingness of Hebrew-language charters to dispense with them are
attractive. Such examples can be easily multiplied.
We know that net, Hebrew charters do attract students who had been
previously enrolled or who would otherwise have enrolled in Jewish day
schools.9' The introduction of an attractive substitute will have substantial
effects on an existing market. 92 As businesses, day schools, yeshivot, and
for that matter supplementary Hebrew schools must worry about their
marginal, not their average, consumer.93 Thus, for example, the potential
91 See Hillman, supra note 67, at 569.
92 See Julie Wiener, "Day School Enrollment Training Downward", (N Y). Jewish Week
(Dec. 13, 2011) (attributing "worrisome" declines in Jewish day school enrollment in part to
"Hebrew charter schools," especially in South Florida).
93 Russo and Cattaro, in the context of proposed Catholic charters, characterize the
removal of religion from curricula as "robbing Peter to pay Paul." See Russo and Cattaro,
supra note 81, at 86. This seems unfairly dismissive of the practice of catering to marginal
consumers, which has confessional as well as economic justifications in both Catholic and
Jewish education.
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loss of the expatriate secular Israeli population is of considerable concern
to some private Jewish day schools. It is therefore not surprising that main-
stream leadership in the Orthodox community has resisted the possibility
of Hebrew chartering, although it would open up some form of Jewish edu-
cation to less-affiliated people.94 This position is echoed by some involved
with non-Orthodox day schools. 95 It is impossible, moreover, to disentangle
the extent to which this opposition is economic and to which it is moti-
vated by the desire to protect the traditional forms of Jewish education,
with their religious emphasis.
Naturally, such positions will be opposed by parents, religious leaders,
and entrepreneurs both financially and religiously attracted to the possi-
bilities of Hebrew chartering.96
A final observation: Hebrew language charters have not yet pushed the
envelope nearly as far as they might with respect to religion. They have the
potential to be considerably more "religious" than they are - Le., to make
themselves closer substitutes for private religious schooling than they
currently do. They might take inspiration from the best-studied Islamic
charter school in the United States, the Tarek ibn Ziyad Academy in
Minnesota, which has made different and more religiously oriented choices
than most Hebrew charters.97 Like the Hebrew charters, the school is offi-
cially secular and does not mandate prayer or other religious observance.
But it does provide release time for prayers and places to conduct it.9 8
94 See Resolution of Rabbinical Council of America, May 12, 2009, available at http://
www.rabbis.org/news/article.cfm?id = 105440 ("Even proposed 'Hebrew language' charter
schools fail to provide an environment conducive to the development of deep-seated Jewish
identity. Further, these schools are mandated to teach limited aspects of Jewish culture,
self-consciously avoiding Torah and mitzvot [acts of religious obligation].").
95 Compare Elaine Cohen, "Hebrew Charter Schools a Very Real Concerm", C - Voices of
Conservative/MasortiJudaism (Winter 2010-20), 55, 56 ("I am very worried that the ardent
efforts to sustain Jewish day schools in many regions of the country are going to be under-
mined" because of low-cost Hebrew charters) with Paul Plotkin, "Charter Schools Can
Reinvigorate the Movement", Cj- Voices of Conservative/MasortiJudaism (Winter 2010-2011),
47, 48 (Hebrew charters, and hoped-for enrollment in supplementary religious programs by
parents of students in those schools, offer "the potential to reinvigorate the Conservative
movement and to folfill the dream of raising a Hebrew andjewishly literate generation").
96 See Plotkin, supra note 95, at 46 (supplementary instruction offered by Hebrew-
language charters could "reinvigorate older Conservative synagogues, creating a significant
new revenue stream and putting many new children on campus. The plan could also
provide employment opportunities for Conservative rabbis, teachers, and youth workers, as
well as the resources to pay them.").
97 See Hillman, supra note 67, at 565.
98 See id
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It mandates modest dress for students and faculty. It follows the Muslim
calendar.99 It cooperates with private parties to provide optional, after-
school religious study.100 It views these practices as "accommodations" to
the religiosity of its students rather than religious exercise or the expression
of a religious preference on its own part, a position in which the Minnesota
authorities have largely, though not completely, acquiesced. 1 1 Hillman sug-
gests that these differences are due in large part to American Muslims being
"both more religiously observant and less affluent" than their American
Jewish counterparts.102 For Orthodox consumers whose yeshiva tuitions
steadily increase, it is therefore easy to see how the Ibn Ziyad model could
become increasingly attractive, and how rabbinical opposition to them
could become more difficult to sustain.
Indeed, parents and educators willing to put up a fight could likely come
even closer to traditional religious curricula and practices than Ibn Ziyad,
while still remaining within the charter framework and within the stric-
tures of the First Amendment. For example, they might be able to survive
constitutional review even were they to provide substantial instruction in
the Bible and other sacred texts. Although immediate objection to any
instructional use of the Bible is nearly assured, 0 3 the Supreme Court has
emphasized that texts sacred to some that also have cultural importance
are a legitimate subject of secular study.104 The Court likely had in mind
older students; it is not trivial to see how one might present Biblical narra-
tives to small children in a secular fashion. But methods of instruction that
avoid truth- and faith-claims could be developed and arguments could be
made. Secular teaching of the Bible could, on the same reasoning, pass the
states' requirement of nonsectarianism. The same arguments are available,
moreover, for texts with substantially less importance to the general culture
but that have affected particular religious cultures, such as the Talmud or
9 See id
100 See id at 566. The school was required to run school buses at the conclusion of the
charter school day rather than after the optional after-school religious studies program.
101 Id at 566-567.
102 Id at 570.
103 See Associated Press, "Idaho Charter School Warned on Use of Bible in Classroom",
Educ. Wk. (Dec. 2, 2009), at 4 (reprimand from Idaho Public Charter School Commission to
Nampa Classical Academy for using the Bible as a teaching tool, notwithstanding a promise
'not to teach religion"; the school "is fighting in federal court").
104 See Abinyton ScI. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("It certainly may be said
that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said...
indicates that... study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a
secularprogram of education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment.").
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the hadith. Arguments for permitting the "non-religious" teaching of such
texts, even if they would not pass muster in a classic public school that is
open to all without regard for background, might succeed in a context
where a charter is freely chosen by those interested in a particular religious
culture.
Such innovations would surely generate opposition at both the regula-
tory and judicial levels. But where religious entrepreneurs apply to estab-
lish religious-culture-themed charters on the same basis as other groups
with other concerns and other themes, it is possible that the states would
not be allowed to penalize them for their focus on religiously-inflected cul-
tural studies. As noted above, the Supreme Court appears to have held that
state legislatures, at their discretion, may place special burdens upon char-
ters organized along explicitly religious lines, even if such burdens do not
apply when organizing schools along other consociational principles.105
But the "religious culture" schools are not religious per se. They might there-
fore fall under the rule of Rosenberg v. Rector,10 6 so that states, having made
space within a "system" of schools for any voices that meet neutral require-
ments, must make room for religious voices as well.107 At the same time,
if the schools are not religious it may be possible to argue that discriminat-
ing against them is not religious discrimination per se. Moreover, in the
many states that cap the number of charters - such caps being an offense to
the market-based theory of chartering and a concession to its political
opponents - charters must be rationed somehow, and such innovations
give regulators more leeway in rejecting or accepting applications for new
charters.
Hebrew charters do not engage in fraud, pretense, or even spin when
they say that they are not religious. 08 They clearly depart substantially
from the way religious private schools are run, and would do so even if they
came much closer to the religious/secular line. They do not teach religion
or religious practice. At the same time, they are clearly substitutes for
religious education. They achieve, at state expense, some of the same objec-
tives that religious schools achieve. Their state subsidies attract some
parents who would not otherwise have chosen a religious private school,
and ease the financial burden upon other parents who would otherwise
105 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
106 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
107 See Weinberg, supra note 74, at 131-132.
108 Martha Minow, for example, describes Hebrew- and Arabic-language schools in pri-
marily linguistic and cultural terms, deemphasizing their religious dimension. See Minow,
supra note 63, at 45-46,133, 186; Minow, supra note 5, at 838-839, 843-844.
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choose religious private schools. None of these things could happen in
a top-down Progressive world, where government deliberates about edu-
cation and then provides it in accordance with those deliberations. But
they are nearly inevitable in a system where deliberation and provision are
the realm of parents and entrepreneurs, some of whom have religious
convictions.
IV. Sectarian Control of School Districts: Achieving Religious Ends
through Secular Means
The New York metropolitan area, the world's second largest Jewish
metropolis (after Tel Aviv), contains several school districts that are heavily
Jewish in population. In a small handful of these, Orthodox Jews gained
voting majorities on local public school boards over the last decade. These
majorities have pursued many of the same objectives that Jewish parents
and educators have sought using the charter school form.
Such efforts rely on a shift in the popular ideology or mindset through
which individuals understand their place in the political structure of
education. As people begin to think of education politics neoliberally, and
of themselves less as citizens jointly pursuing the common good and more
as individual consumers seeking to maximize their preferences in a mar-
ketplace, their changing attitudes affect the ways in which they behave in
republican as well as market contexts.
Local Orthodox majorities result from a strong Orthodox preference for
living among coreligionists. Even after such majorities arise in a particular
school district, nearly all Orthodox families continue to send their children
to private yeshivot. The public schools enroll fewer students than the local
yeshiva systems, and serve a student population mostly non-Jewish and
nearly exclusively non-Orthodox. This vector of circumstances - Orthodox
voting control of the public school board, a public school student popula-
tion almost completely non-Orthodox, and a larger private yeshiva student
population - describes the school districts in Lawrence, New York (one
of the "Five Towns" on New York's Long Island), East Ramapo, New York
(a district that includes the towns of Monsey and New Square), and
Lakewood, New Jersey.10 9
109 Teaneck NJ., another jurisdiction with a large Orthodox population, has seen
the defeat of school board candidates widely thought to be part of a nascent Orthodox bloc.
See Joseph Ax, "Three Orthodox Candidates Challenge Teaneck Status Quo", North Jersey
Record (April 14, 2010).
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Such political alignments initially seem unremarkable. Political domi-
nance of school districts by religious communities and concomitant efforts
to direct the public schools in pursuit of religious ends are nothing new in
the United States. The "nonsectarian" Protestantism that long functioned as
the defacto religion of public schools was ubiquitous because Protestant
majorities dominated many districts and states."0 After the Supreme
Court imposed a more neutral and demanding religious nonsectarianism
on public schools, these same majorities often resisted, unable or unwilling
to see any conflict between a non-denominational Protestantism and
public education.' These religious majorities continue to use their politi-
cal power to mitigate the secularism required by the Supreme Court.
Also well known are contemporary efforts by conservative Christian
groups to win school board majorities and thus to further their more
particularist religious interests. In several local districts as well as a handful
of states," 2 blocs of conservative Protestant voters have sought aggressively
to modify educational policies to make them more consistent with their
faith. Melissa M. Deckman catalogues evangelical efforts to introduce
moments of silence into the school day and to precede after-school activi-
ties with prayer; to make sex education coextensive with the teaching of
abstinence; to abolish school programs and activities that address homo-
sexuality without condemnation; to teach "creation science" or its variants;
to instruct students "that U.S. culture is superior to all others"; and to block
the selection of textbooks that are "liberal or 'humanistic.'"" 3 Conservative
Protestant majorities at the state and local levels have generally not overtly
sought to defy the ban on prayer or Bible study in school proper, preferring
to focus on religious practice outside of school hours, on policy changes
that have ostensibly secular motivations, and on resistance to what they
110 See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
"I See Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Phillip E. Hammond, The School Prayer Decisions: From
Court Policy to Local Practice (1971), 31-32 & fig.7. Resistance continues to this day. See Kent
Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution, V. 2: Establishment and Fairness (2oo8), io6 ("[A]
radio interview I once did turned out to be occupied entirely with the question, 'What could
be wrong with the inclusive and innocuous prayer in Engel v. Vitale?' Justice Stewart's senti-
ments are shared by many of our citizens.").
112 See April Castro, "Election Loosens Conservatives' Hold on Texas Board", Educ. Wk.
(Mar. 1o, 2010), at 23.
113 Melissa M. Deckman, School Board Battles: The Christian Right in Local Politics (2004),
13-40, 149.
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view as non-Christian influence in the schools. 4 Nevertheless it could not
be more clear that religious motivations underlie these policy agendas.
Although districts dominated by Jewish sectarians share obvious
similarities with these districts, there also important differences. First, it
matters that the sectarians are Jews and not Protestants;Jews are a tiny and
marginal sect rather than a dominant religious group or even a large
religious minority.115 The types of policies sought by conservative Prote-
stants, though their victories are hard-fought, are only alterations to an
American pedagogy and school culture founded in Protestantism." 6 And
whereas Protestants have long wielded power in American schooling, for
Orthodox Jews to do so would have been unthinkable even twenty years
ago, when everyone understood that public schools were assimilatory insti-
tutions, for better and for worse, not arenas where particularistic Jewish
values or interests should be articulated or sought."7
Moreover, when involving themselves in school politics many conserva-
tive Protestants intend to enroll their children in public schools. Although
nearly one million conservative Protestant children go to private Christian
schools, and at least half of the one million homeschoolers in the United
States are conservative Protestants, "92 percent of conservative Protestant
families have their children in public schools, which is nearly identical to
the national average."18 Such families seek political power over education
in order to make their own children's education, as well as everyone else's,
conform to their values. This stands in stark contrast with Orthodox Jews,
who seek control of public schools that they do not intend to use them-
selves. After gaining political control over school districts, the Orthodox
114 See David Sikkink, "Conservative Protestants, Schooling, and Democracy", in S. Brint
and J.R. Schroedel (eds.), Evangelicals and Democracy in America, v.1: Religion and Society
(2009), 276.
15 See Chiswick, supra note 84, at ioo, 105 n.6.
116 See Bruce A. Collet, "Sites of Refuge: Refugees, Religiosity and Public Schools in the
United States", 24 Educ. Poly (2OO), 189,192.
117 In their marginality, the Orthodox districts are more similar to the Colorado City
Unified School District, located in a "remote area of Northern Arizona and southern Utah,"
which has been "long dominated by a polygamous sect" of dissenting Mormons. That sect,
the "Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints," moved to the area and
"chose it decades ago for its isolation." Management of the district by the sect has been
troubled. "The state placed the district in receivership in late 2005 because of financial insol-
vency and mismanagement," and released it, stating that it "was not in good shape both
academically and financially" in October 2009. Associated Press, "Remote Arizona District
Emerges from Four Years of State Control", Educ. Wk (Nov. 4, 2009), at 4.
118 Sikkink, supra note H4, at 277.
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continue, in overwhelming numbers, to send their children to private
yeshivot.
The other obvious analogy to these districts is the school district of
Kiryas Joel in upstate New York. Kiryas Joel is unquestionably the most
famous sectarian school district in the United States, and happens also to
be controlled by Orthodox Jews. The eponymous town of Kiryas Joel
was incorporated in New York with boundaries "drawn to include just...
320 acres owned and inhabited entirely by Satma[r]" Hasidim." 9 The
Satmar are not only sectarian but quintessentially isolationist. Indeed, they
relocated to upstate NewYork from Brooklyn in order to remove themselves
more fully from wider society.120 Among many other anti-assimilationist
and isolationist practices, 21 the Satmar as a rule send their children to
private yeshivot.122 Nevertheless, they sought to create a school district
coextensive with the town of KiryasJoel in order to provide a secular, state-
funded program for the community's disabled children.123
The legislature of the State of New York acquiesced in this desire,124 only
to be overturned by the United States Supreme Court on the grounds that
the creation of the district violated the First Amendment.12 5 The Satmar of
Kiryas Joel were subsequently successful, working with the legislature, in
reconstituting the district so that it met the dictates of the Court. 26 The
services the district provides to disabled children are secular in nature;
there are no religious activities as there are in theyeshivot. 27 Nevertheless,
it is clear that the secular school district provides to Satmar families a par-
tial substitute for religious education, in that it provides to disabled stu-
dents at least the social and linguistic segregation (though not the gender
segregation) 28 they would have in yeshivot and emphatically would not
have in the neighboring district schools they attended until the district was
established.129
n9 Bd of Educ. of KiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 691 (1994).
120 Id at 691; Abner Greene, "Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality", 96 Colum. L.
Rev. (1996), 1,4.
121 See KiryasJoe4 512 U.S. at 694 (cataloging some of these practices).
122 See id
123 See id at 692.
124 See id at 693.
125 See id at 702.
126 See Lou Grumet and Justin JaMail, "The Lessons of 'Kiryas Joel'", N.Y State Bar Ass'nJ
(May 2011), 11, 15.
127 See Greene, supra note 12o, at 5.
128 See Kiryasjoel 512 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129 See id at 692.
A.J. Saiger /Journal of Law, Religion & State 1 (202) 18o-214
KiryasJoel is similar to other sectarianjewish districts in that its Orthodox
population has political control of its school district even as that popula-
tion uses the schools only in exceptional cases. It differs, however, in that
the public schools remain an endeavor designed for the welfare of the local
Orthodox population - in the case of Kiryas Joel, of disabled Satmar stu-
dents. The formal church-state issue that such a district faces is the same as
that faced by districts dominated by conservative Protestants and by the
districts I discuss below: public schools run by the state must be secular.
But the politics are entirely different. The religious community of Kiryas
Joel does not seek to impose its educational values or political priorities
upon outsiders through the management of the public schools. There are
well-documented and substantial cases of internal dissent and disagree-
ment among the Satmar of Kiryas Joel, but however serious and legally
troubling, these are intramural and rarely related to the education of the
disabled.130 The district stands in sharp contrast to the sectarian Orthodox
districts listed above, where an Orthodox bloc seeks to run public schools
that benefit other people's children.
The most central political conflicts in the latter set of districts revolve
around school budgets. Orthodox blocs are hostile to expenditures,131 pre-
sumably because Orthodox families pay their taxes but as non-users of the
schools reap no direct benefits from their operation. 32 One could say that
these Orthodox districts are the exception that proves William Fischel's
claim that public school expenditure gains majority support because school
quality is capitalized into home values. 133 Such capitalization gives reason
to those whom Fischel calls "homevoters," a group that includes childless
voters who do not themselves use the schools, to support school quality.134
These incentives operate, Fischel notes, "for any voter who owns a home in
which families with children might live" - because those potential children
130 See Stewart Ain, "Chassidic Dissidents Press Cases in Court", (N Y)Jewish Wk. (June 14,
2011) ("dissidents" within Kiryas Joel allege religious commandeering of local government).
131 Larry Gordon, "Campaign of Deception", Five Towns Jewish Times (April 4, 2007)
(Lawrence);Josh Nathan-Kazis, "In N.Y Town, Orthodox and Locals View for School Control",
Jewish Daity Forward (May 6, 20H) (East Ramapo).
132 Incantalupo v. Lawrence Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15,652 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318-19 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (reporting allegations made by plaintiffs regarding the Lawrence School District);
"East Ramapo Residents Voting with Their Pocketbooks, While Others Voting for Education",
LoHud.com (May 12, 2010) (news site for the Lower Hudson Valley of New York).
133 See William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local
Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land- Use Policies (2001), 149.
134 Id
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might attend public schools.135 But in Orthodox-majority districts, where
yeshiva attendance is the norm and housing demand among potential
Orthodox immigrants robust, there is less expectation that potential buyers
will themselves use the schools, mitigating homevoters' incentives to care
about school quality.
Boards and the communities they represent have also been riven by
controversies over the extension of secular services to private school
students,13 6 such as special education,13 7 subsidized transportation to and
from school,138 and access to ball fields and similar facilities. 139 There have
also been battles over the consolidation and closing of schools: growing
Orthodox populations generally bring shrinking public school enroll-
ments.140 Moreover, because growingyeshivot are among the most obvious
potential purchasers of newly empty public school buildings, some attri-
bute boards' support for school closings to a desire to make buildings avail-
able to theyeshiva system.141 Persistent conflict over these and other issues
have often led to routine bloc voting on boards, with friction even on rela-
tively innocuous issues.142 The politics have been bitterly acrimonious. 143
In one sense, the positions favored by the Orthodox blocs in these
districts are deeply religious. As in the case of conservative Protestants, the
135 Id
136 See Zach Patberg, "Lakewood Parents Express Concerns to School Board", Asbury Park
Press (Aug. 25, 2oog), available at APP.com.
137 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 320; Josh Nathan-Kazis, "Bias Feared in Public
School Proposal to Absorb Yiddish Special Ed Program",Jewish Daily Forward (Jan. 28, 2011)
(proposal in East Ramapo, ultimately abandoned, for public system to take over a "Yiddish
and Hebrew bilingual special education program" that had previously been privately
managed).
138 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
139 See Gordon, supra note 13L
140 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21; Gordon, supra note 131 (describing a
contretemps in Lawrence in which candidates opposed to the Orthodox bloc on the
school board accused it of planning to "seize the Middle School - 'the jewel in our real estate
crown' - and turn it into a building that will host a yeshiva"); Peter Applebome, "Rancor
where Private-School Parents Make Public-School Decisions", NY Times (April 26, 2009)
(describing school closings in East Ramapo).
141 See Sumathi Reddy, "School Fight Gets Heated", Wall St.J, (May 16, 2011) (allegations
that "school board has favored private schools, closing two public schools and arranging for
them to be used by yeshivas").
142 Alexandra Cheney, "East Ramapo Meets Tuesday to Discuss Controversial Lawyer
Hiring", LoHud.com (Nov. 29, 2009) (news site for Lower Hudson Valley of New York).
143 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (allegation that Orthodox bloc seeks "'to estab-
lish Orthodox Judaism as the official religion' of Lawrence") (quoting complaint); Reddy,
supra note 141 (East Ramapo).
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preferences of the community regarding public schooling are shaped
pervasively by a religious worldview that embraces all aspects of life. 44
Orthodox thinking moreover places a higher value upon comprehensive
religious education for all children than that of conservative Protestants.
The commitment of the Orthodox to the yeshiva system in many ways
parallels the dedication of the Old Order Amish to practical education
for students of high school age: exit from regular public education is reli-
giously central.145 But in another, equally compelling sense, the politics
of the Orthodox blocs are completely secular.146 They do not seek reli-
gious instruction in public schools; what they want is frugality, access, and
consolidation. These are values widely shared among Americans, and it
seems safe to say that most proponents of such values hold them
for strictly secular reasons. In this the preferences of the Orthodox are dis-
tinct from Amish opposition to formal high school instruction and from
conservative Christian doubts about evolution. Were Orthodox Jews
required, as some have suggested that citizens should be, to offer secular
justifications for their preferences in order to be able to assert them in the
public realm, 147 they would have no difficulty doing so in this instance.
In Lawrence, NewYork, the question whether the politics of the Orthodox
bloc were secular reached the federal district court. 48 Non-Orthodox oppo-
nents of the governing regime sued the school board, charging that an
"'Orthodox majority,' in general, has sought 'to convert the public [School
Board] into an Orthodox ruling committee, and to establish Orthodox
Judaism as the official religion of Lawrence.'" 49 The court dismissed the
claims with alacrity. That a religious community "mobilizes" in favor of
cost-cutting, resource-sharing, and retrenchment, policies favored by them
because they educate their own children in private schools, the court held,
144 See Sikkink, supra note n4, at 28o ("A... cultural strand within conservative
Protestantism is the belief that all aspect of life, including teaching and learning, are inher-
ently religious.").
145 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) ("Broadly speaking, the Old Order
Amish religion pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its adherents... Amish
objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central
religious concepts. They object to the high school, and higher education generally, because
the values they teach are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life.").
146 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
147 See Gregory P. Magarian, "Religious Argument, Free Speech Theory, and Democratic
Dynamism", 86 Notre Dame L Rev (2on), 119, 121 (summarizing the debate).
148 See Incantalupo, 652 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
149 Id at 319.
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does not change the fact that each of these is a secular, not a religious,
position.150
As is true with respect to religiously oriented charter schools, it is also
clear that a determined Orthodox majority could pursue its religious pref-
erences more overtly than it has.151 Such potential may be realized should
the tuition problem in the Orthodox community further erode the norm of
yeshiva education.152 Consider, for example, a plan floated in 2005, after
Orthodox representatives first gained a majority on the Lawrence school
board, by a group of Lawrence yeshiva families struggling with tuition
bills.'53 They suggested that the public schools offer a special program,
open to anyone in the district but taught separately from the standard
track. It would offer only one elective, which would be Hebrew language,
and would not begin until the late morning.154 The idea was that Orthodox
children could have prayer and religious study in the mornings at local syn-
agogues and then enroll as public school students to receive their schooling
in the afternoon from the state. 55 Theyeshivot would in this way be relieved
of the expense of maintaining a secular program.
The late-in-the-day time block was an important feature of this
proposal.' 56 It allowed morning prayer, the longest service of the day, to
continue under religious school supervision; and it preserved the yeshiva
tradition of having religious studies come first in the school day, when
students are thought freshest. The hours made it likely that few, if any,
non-Orthodox students would be attracted to the proposed track, formally
open to all; the atypical hours would foreclose extracurricular activities and
be incompatible with the schedules of many secular families. The social
homogeneity of the yeshiva system could therefore be substantially pre-
served even with respect to secular studies.
This proposal was made in 2005; the following year, the United
States Education Department promulgated new, more permissive rules on
lSO Id at 318.
151 See supra notes 98-107 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
153 See Steven I. Weiss, "Long Island Proposal on Day Schools Draws Flak on Church-State
Grounds"Jewish Daily Forward (July 29, 2005).
154 See id; cf Randy Furst and Sarah LeMagie, "ACLU Suit Claims School Promotes
Religion", Minneapolis-St. Paul Star Trib. (Jan. 22, 2009), at 3B (Ibn Ziyad charter school offers
no bus home immediately at the end of school, waiting to run buses until the end of after-
school activities that include "a religious studies course run by the Muslim American Society
that more than half the students took last year").
155 See Weiss, supra note 153.
156 See id
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single-sex education. 57 I expect that the proposers, had it been a year
later, might also have sought single-sex arrangements, thus duplicating
another valued aspect of theyeshiva program, and perhaps concomitantly
further reducing its attractiveness to children outside the Orthodox
community.1 58
The Lawrence plan, with or without its imagined same-sex extension, is
very far from the Progressive "one best system." But one can argue that it is
in principle no different from the other secular priorities of the Orthodox
population of Lawrence. Its planks are carefully secular and neutral. It
accommodates the extracurricular schedule of a large group of students
and their secular educational preferences; on its face, it does no more than
that. At the same time it does involve preferences unlikely to be shared out-
side the Orthodox population - which is a big part of its motivation.
Politically, the proposal made for strange alliances. Political leadership of
the district was in Orthodox hands, and understood the pressures high
tuition was creating in the community. Even if district leadership had not
been sympathetic, however, it needed the votes and political support of
the Orthodox, in order to ratify school budgets 159 and to re-elect sitting
members of the school board. The professional, secular leadership of the
district - the superintendent and his staff- shared the need to maintain
political support.160 At the same time, the district was acutely conscious of
the financial benefits public schools reap from having large private-school
populations: a sudden obligation to educate all those Orthodox children
would not bring any new local resources, because the Orthodox families
were already paying property tax. (Increased state aid would not cover the
costs of increased enrollment.) The district's professional leadership there-
fore took a lukewarm attitude towards this proposal, promising to help its
promulgators but making no commitments. Not surprisingly, and again in
parallel with the Hebrew charter schools, 161 the strongest opponents were
local rabbis, for whom the yeshiva-at-any-cost norm is religiously impor-
tant and also supports a large and vital industry in their communities. 162
157 United States Department of Education, "Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex
in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance", Final Rule, 71
Fed Reg. (Oct. 25, 2oo6), 62,529.
158 Cf Minow, supra note 63, at no (noting effects of 2oo6 same-sex education rules on
both traditional public and charter schools).
159 Lawrence voters had voted down several school budgets in prior years.
160 See Weiss, supra note 153.
161 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
162 See id
210
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Rabbinic opposition in turn dampened political support among the laity. In
this particular contest between rabbinic power and tuition pressure, the
former prevailed; but no observer of these communities should venture to
predict future results of similar conflicts.
The contingent and perhaps temporary failure of this proposal should
not obscure, moreover, the quite substantial accommodations that Ortho-
dox religious sectarians with a local majority have gained from their school
districts. They have successfully reduced budgets and gained access to
specific parts of the public school programs that they can use: ball fields,
facilities off-hours, and school buses. In Englewood NJ, another heavily
Orthodox enclave, public school authorities have established bilingual
Hebrew-English public schools that will compete with Jewish day schools,
in part to meet voter demands and in part to forestall the creation of
Hebrew charter schools.1 63
This brief account of school boards under Orthodox control could be
taken to confirm, rather than vitiate, the continuing dominance of tradi-
tional American paradigms for public education. The districts operate in
the mainstream of American law. Certainly efforts by these sectarian
majorities on school boards to assert the interests of the religious Jewish
community pose a less obvious challenge to the traditional model of
American education than does the neoliberalism of the charter movement.
The districts continue to function as monopoly providers of secular public
education, and whatever power the Orthodox community exerts is medi-
ated through the traditional, Progressive institutions of the franchise and
the elected board, rather than through newfangled forms like charters. It is
undisputed that "individuals who happen to be religious may hold public
office.": '64 And when the Supreme Court held in 1969 that the franchise in
school board elections, as a matter of equality under the Fourteenth
Amendment, extended even to a childless resident with no property, all
the parties to the case agreed that taxpayers as well as parents had an inter-
est in the public schools and a right to equal voice in their governance.
65
The efforts of sectarian blocs to limit expenditure, widen access, and
consolidate schools are legitimate and have secular justifications.
163 See Peter Applebome, "Diversity Plan for Public Schools, Using Hebrew", NY Times
(February 26,2009). Englewood does not have a majority Orthodox voting bloc on its school
board.
164 Bd of Educ. ofKiryasJoel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 698-699 (1994).
165 Kramerv. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 631 (1969).
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Nevertheless, although these districts are uncontroversially republican,
they are simultaneously deeply anti-Progressive. Their politics would be
impossible but for the substantial erosion of the ideological dominance of
Progressivism. The 2005 Lawrence plan for a late-day public school session,
designed to meet the needs of the Orthodox and put off most everybody
else, is inimical to Progressive common schooling. This is made vivid by the
local usage that describes the Orthodox as the "private-school community"
and their opponents as the "public-school community."166 This usage is
understood by all even though it is the Orthodox bloc that governs the pub-
lic schools. The heated exchanges between the two groups, on the Internet
and other forums, show that the two groups share few basic ideas regarding
school governance.
The self-styled "public-school" community, the heirs to Progressivism,
believe that public schools are common schools and that their health ben-
efits everyone. Why would anyone want, or would anyone else allow, people
who are not interested in having the best possible public schools join, much
less control, a public school board? To them, public schools are a trust and
the board their fiduciaries. If there is to be a "private-school" community
that is disinterested in the welfare of the public schools and averse to taxa-
tion in their support, their withdrawal from public schooling should be par-
alleled by a withdrawal from public school politics.
This is not, to put it mildly, the worldview of the anti-Progressive small-r
republicans who now run these districts. They think that people are enti-
tled to want whatever they want with respect to public schools, just as they
are entitled to do with respect to any other local service. 67 State and federal
law, but not any broader duty, limn the obligations of the board with respect
to the adequacy of public school services. Moreover, consumers of private
education are as much part of the public-school polity as consumers
of public schools. They have a "right" - another oft-heard term in these
debates - to benefit from those schools as much as students enrolled in
them do, to the extent allowed by state law. Therefore they should enjoy, for
example, secular services like buses and ball fields on an equal basis. This is
republican but not Progressive. It views the question whether a family is
part of the actual public school polity as completely separate from the
166 E.g., Larry Gordon, Editorial, "Campaign of Deception", Five Towns Jewish Times
(April 19, 2007).
167 See Amy S. Wells, Alejandra Lopez and Jennifer J. Holme et aL, "Charter Schools as
Postmodern Paradox: Rethinking Social Stratification in an Age of Deregulated School
Choice", 69 Harv. Educ. Rev. (1999), 172,174-175.
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question whether its children have opted out of the miniature polis that
Progressive common schools seek to embody.
I make no claims about which of these camps is legitimate or valid or
more persuasive as a matter of politics or political theory. But I do mean to
suggest that this view is (a) new and (b) illustrative of an important change.
School board politics would not have been conducted this way twenty years
ago. This is in part because Jews and Orthodox Jews in particular would
have hesitated to assert their parochial interests with muscularity in any
sort of secular politics. But that reluctance was related to the political/
cultural assumption that would have been obvious then and is not obvious
today, that to opt out of public schooling is also to opt out of public school
governance. The "private-school community" in today's Lawrence and East
Ramapo and Lakewood think of education politics in terms of their rights
and their individual preferences, not in terms of what experts say or in
terms of the widely shared common good. This mode of thought, distant
indeed from Progressivism, is surely shared by many, many Americans
situated very far away - geographically, religiously, and culturally - from
the Jews of Lawrence. One should feel confident that the 2005 Lawrence
plan will not be the last anti-Progressive proposal floated in the evolving
ideological environment.
V. Conclusion
When the Supreme Court decided Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, upholding
the constitutionality of publicly funded vouchers that parents could direct
to religious as well as secular schools, Justice Souter wrote a long, thorough,
and angry dissent, which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. 68
Justice Breyer also wrote separately, explaining his separate concurrence
(joined by justices Stevens and Souter) in this way:
I write separately... to emphasize the risk that publicly financed voucher
programs pose in terms of religiously based social conflict. I do so because
I believe that the Establishment Clause concern for protecting the Nation's
social fabric from religious conflict poses an overriding obstacle to the
implementation of this well-intentioned school voucher program. And by
explaining the nature of the concern, I hope to demonstrate why, in my view,
"parental choice" cannot significantly alleviate the constitutional problem. 16 9
168 Zebnan, 512 U.S. at 686 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169 Id at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The majority dismissed Justice Breyer, saying he was raising "invisible
specters of 'divisiveness' and 'religious strife'" with no evidence that they
had or were likely to arise.170 At the time I would have been inclined to
agree.171 But Breyer may have been prescient. Both school choice - albeit
in the form of charter schools rather than voucher programs - and the
penetration of neoliberal ideas into school district politics have occasioned
significant religious conflict. 172
At the same time, Breyer was wrong to have imagined that choice in
particular would stoke "religiously based social conflict."1 73 That conflict
has been at least as bitter in the religiously-dominated school boards as in
the charter-school quasi-markets. This is not surprising: school board
decisions directly affect all students, whereas charter students choose to
participate in religious charters. But the two contexts have more similari-
ties than differences. The root of religiously-based social conflict is not
choice per se but the erosion of the Progressive consensus in favor of a
scheme where rights, entitlement, and choice are primary conceptual
categories. Once such a cultural shift takes hold, there is plenty of room in
the system as constituted for religiously-based voters, politicians, parents,
and educators to inject religion into American schooling in ways that were
until recently unimaginable.
The resulting educational marketplace is likely to look very different than
the "one best system." There will be more religion, potentially a lot more, as
states increasingly facilitate neoliberal education rather than monopolisti-
cally provide common education. As the interaction of Jewish education
and the educational political culture shows, the nature and shape of that
religion will depend upon entrepreneurialism in the market and parental
preferences, more than upon state action. It is therefore sure to surprise. In
any event, that revolution is upon us. We have already opened the doors to
it. I doubt whether we can close them again.
170 Id at 662 n.7.
1 Accord 2 Greenawalt, supra note in, at 417.
172 See Steven I. Weiss, "Jew vs. Jew Struggle in N.Y. School Board Election", Jewish Daily
Forward (May 20, 2005).
i73 Zelman, 512 U.S. at 717 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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